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What else did we learn during this investigation?

During the course of this investigation, we came across a number of issues which, while not the focus of this review, have raised important points that merit closer examination.

Many of the things we heard and many of the issues we have considered have to do with the mandates of governments in ensuring Canada's food safety. As others have said before us, Canada's food safety requires the active, informed, and committed participation of all food safety partners. Current governance is not as sophisticated as this very important domain requires. Furthermore, many of the structures and the tools currently in place are outdated.

In a further effort to reform and modernize the food safety system in Canada, we offer the following guidance to the Government of Canada on additional matters, which should be acted upon.

Government of Canada Food Safety Legislative and Regulatory Framework

Several pieces of key federal legislation in place to govern food safety and quality were enacted by Parliament many decades ago (e.g. the current Food and Drugs Act was first enacted in 1951). These are widely recognized to be out of date and in need of substantial consolidation and modernization.

After the CFIA was created in 1997, a bill was drafted to deal with legislative shortcomings known at that time. In 1999, Bill C-80, the Canada Food Safety and Inspection Act, was tabled in the House of Commons. The proposed bill would have allowed for the enhancement of inspectors' powers, the implementation of electronic commerce, inspection of all food products at points of entry, the licensing of all food importers, and the designation of specific points of entry for certain commodities. The bill passed first reading but never made it further on the House calendar due to an election.

The Auditor General's 2000 Report to Parliament noted constraints in federal food legislation and recommended that the government address these limitations. The government acknowledged this recommendation. In 2004, the government introduced a modification of the earlier bill that focussed only on inspector powers and a series of prohibitions and licensing provisions. The bill, like the 1999 draft legislation C-80, did not proceed.

A third attempt to update selected federal food safety legislation was introduced in the spring of 2008, but it also died on the order paper when the election was called in September 2008.

Something we heard during our interviews:

Science changes quickly, regulations do not.

A fourth attempt is currently being considered, although the scope of the proposed changes is modest in relation to earlier proposed amendments. We heard that the latest proposed legislative changes are under discussion.

Recommendation:

  1. To simplify and modernize federal legislation and regulations which significantly affect food safety, the Government of Canada should mandate a lead agency to conduct a comprehensive review and recommend improvements in a timely manner, taking into account the amendments or additions required to enforce, where applicable, the recommendations included in this report (e.g. the requirement to disclose any threat to food safety as covered by recommendations 6 and 20).

Federal organizational governance and structure

Through interviews with senior executives from various levels of government, industry, and other stakeholders, as well as the documentation review, we identified governance and structural problems. These recommendations are relevant to the overall performance and effectiveness of the federal organizations that were involved in the 2008 outbreak and their relationships with provincial and territorial partners in carrying out their food safety mandates and responsibilities.

Canadian Food Inspection Agency

Governance, structure, and accountability

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency was created, in part, to contribute to consumer protection and to create a more uniform and consistent approach to safety and quality standards as well as a risk- based inspection system. These expectations have not been fully met.

Several attempts were initiated to update federal food safety laws and to introduce risk-based approaches to the CFIA inspection activities. However, while Bills were presented, they were not adopted because events including elections and major crises, such as mad cow and avian influenza outbreaks, disrupted the CFIA's renewal agenda to update laws and programs.

Furthermore, by establishing the Agency, the government sought a greater degree of collaboration and consultation among federal organizations and with other levels of government. This collaboration has not yet happened to the degree anticipated. As noted in previous chapters, there were problems with collaboration and there was confusion about the roles and responsibilities of various organizations during the initial stages of the food safety investigation.

In addition, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is limited by the fact that it is organized, structured, and managed as a traditional federal department. Its objectives would be better achieved if it had greater flexibility to focus on its primary regulatory mandate of inspection (compliance) and enforcement. The current model has not resulted in clear lines of authority, accountability, or meaningful collaboration. There is little information available publicly on overall program performance, expectations, and costs beyond the high-level measures found in the CFIA's Departmental Performance Report. Developing clearer lines of authority by introducting organizational direction, responsibility, and accountability measures could improve the Agency's performance and enhance collaboration within and outside the organization.

Also noteworthy is the frequent turnover of the person appointed as President (Chief Executive Officer) of the CFIA. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act authorizes the appointment of a President for a renewable five-year term. Since the Agency's creation in 1997, no president has stayed for a full five years. Five different presidents have been appointed in the past 12 years. This level of change at the most senior position of the organization does not promote continuity of executive management or advance the renewal agenda.

The introduction of the new federal meat inspection system (Compliance Verification System) lacked adequate planning and consultation and was not approved by the Agency's Executive Committee.

As previously described, the CVS has shortcomings, including the fact that inspectors' tasks have not been adjusted to take into account each plant's unique characteristics. This is an example of the organization not putting appropriate emphasis on a key component of its regulatory mandate.

With respect to accountability to Parliament and Canadians, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency has tabled, in lieu of its legislated five-year Corporate Business Plan (2008-2013), a one-year operational plan taken entirely from its annual Report on Plan and Priorities document (Estimates, Part III). This submission falls short of the five-year plan required by the legislation. As well, the absence of a consultative process with the Agency's partners and stakeholders, and a lack of consensus on a shared long-term vision on its primary areas of focus for the next five-year business cycle, has isolated the CFIA.

The oversight and decision-making associated with the CFIA's resources allocation, regulatory program delivery, and personnel management appears to lack the rigour warranted by a regulatory agency of this nature. The previous example of the Agency's Corporate Business Plan for 2008-13 is another demonstration of functioning more like a department in the conduct of its business.

While the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act includes a provision for a Minister's Advisory Board to provide advice on any matter within the responsibilities of the Agency, Board members have not been appointed since 2002.

These factors represent, within the context of our investigative review, the rationale for the introduction of an enhanced model of governance for the CFIA.

Recommendations:

  1. As soon as possible, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, supported by independent experts, should initiate a comprehensive review of
    1. its organizational structure;
    2. the current delegation of responsibility and lines of accountability within the Agency; and
    3. its decision-making processes.
  2. Concurrent with the review, the federal government should consider replacing the current requirement for an Advisory Board with a Board of Management which, subject to powers to be retained by the Minister including all decisions related to policy, legislative, regulatory and emergency matters, should oversee the organization and operational management of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and advise the Minister on policy matters.

    At a minimum, the federal government should consider the immediate appointment of the Advisory Board established under subsection 10 (1) of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act. The Board should be specifically directed to advise the Minister on issues relevant to the vision, accountability, mandate, and public perception of the Agency and risk management.
  3. The federal government should endorse the need for continuity and vision at the Canadian Food Inspection Agency by making efforts to ensure, wherever practical, that the 5-year mandate given to the President under section 5 of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act is fulfilled.
  4. As a regulatory agency, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency should create a formal and transparent consultation strategy to define its required engagement with stakeholders.
  5. To ensure consistent and timely enforcement practices across the country, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency should review the interpretation and application of its rules and enabling legislation.

Broad mandate that covers three lines of business

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency has a broad mandate that covers the administration and/or enforcement of thirteen laws, which regulate more than thirty-five sectors of the economy. These sectors are commonly categorized under three lines of business: food safety, animal health, and plant health.

The inherent complexities of such breadth and the constant pressures of emerging issues, including numerous crises management interventions in those sectors, limit the Executive Committee's ability to be anticipatory and proactive.

"If you look after animal and plant health and food safety in Canada - your goods will be highly marketable in other countries."

Bob Kingston
President of the Agriculture Chapter of the Public Service Alliance of Canada

In our view, the CFIA could benefit from the ongoing advice of experts in the field to stay current with the numerous elements that should be guiding the organization's future. These experts could help each management team focus on current, and anticipate future, changes affecting each line of business. They could also assist in designing appropriate and timely regulatory interventions to meet the needs of consumers and industry. In saying this, we acknowledge the advice being provided by the CFIA's Scientific Advisory Committee and Audit Committee (which includes external members).

Recommendation:

  1. The three main lines of business of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, food safety, animal health, and plant health should be assisted by permanent expert advisory committees to guide their evolution.

Office of Food Safety and Recall

A further concern raised during the investigative review is the structural situation of the Office of Food Safety and Recall within CFIA. The Office was established as a stand-alone operation following a major foodborne emergency in 1999 due to pre-packaged luncheon meats. The incident involved 800 Canadians, mainly children, who became ill after eating tainted foods.

The mandate of the Office is to coordinate food emergency investigations and execute recall activities (including identifying the source of food contamination), as well as supporting Health Canada in conducting health risk assessments. The Office has critical responsibilities that do not easily fit within any particular part of the CFIA. Repeated changes in the organization over the years have resulted in the removal of some key functions that reduce its effectiveness in times of emergency.

During the 2008 outbreak, recall activities were managed within this single part of the organization, with very limited engagement of senior executives. Nevertheless, the recall activities associated with the outbreak were appropriate and all standard operating procedures were followed.

Recommendations:

  1. The Office of Food Safety and Recall should report directly to the office of the President of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.
  2. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency should ensure that the Office of Food Safety and Recall has dedicated resources to undertake all the CFIA activities concerning recalls. The Office of Food Safety and Recall should be identified as the CFIA's primary point of contact with Health Canada during a food emergency.

Public Health Agency of Canada

The Public Health Agency of Canada was established in 2004 in response to growing concerns about the capacity of Canada's public health system to anticipate and respond effectively to public health threats, including foodborne illnesses.

The PHAC's creation followed recommendations from leading public health experts who called for clear federal leadership on public health matters and improved collaboration within and between jurisdictions. We heard continued support for the PHAC to play this role.

As was said of the CFIA, we heard that the PHAC's structure too closely resembles that of a federal department. As a result, it may be hampered in its ability to fulfil its mandate.

We repeatedly heard that the Centre for Foodborne, Environmental, and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases team is under-resourced and not optimally organized to face growing emergency situations. Because of globalization, the incidence of foodborne illnesses is increasing. Foodborne illness is now the largest class of emerging infectious diseases in Canada. And, at that, there is a growing consensus that the actual rate of foodborne diseases maybe be 300 to 350 times more frequent than the number of reported cases suggests.1 The PHAC does not appear to have adequately adjusted its focus to be ready to respond to this new reality.

As well, we heard that more attention should be given to the management needs of this organization as it is primarily an operational entity. Its main concerns should be to

  • develop the capacity and the capability to rapidly and efficiently respond to the broad spectrum of health emergency situations that fall within the mandate of the federal government;
  • adjust the assignment of resources to pre-determined priorities;
  • identify the surge capacity needs to support various emergencies in infectious, communicable, and foodborne diseases;
  • continuously create better networks among various components of the federal- provincial/territorial-local operational response systems needed to manage public health in Canada; and
  • address technology support gaps to enable this dispersed network of public health officials to respond quickly to health emergencies.

We heard that the PHAC was expected to be more advanced in its development after five years, especially in the area of national health emergency leadership and management. However, we have also heard that recent progress has been noted with respect to the way the current H1N1 health crisis has been handled.

Recommendations:

  1. As soon as possible, the Public Health Agency of Canada, supported by independent experts, should initiate a comprehensive review of its structure and operational procedures with the objective of ensuring a more responsive and flexible organization to support national readiness for public health threats.
  2. Concurrent with the review, the federal government should consider permanently assigning day-to-day operational management responsibilities of the Public Health Agency of Canada to an associate deputy head (i.e. a Chief Operating Officer equivalent to a second-in-command) to allow the Chief Public Health Officer to focus on his executive duties and responsibilities as the lead health professional of the Government of Canada in relation to public health and to ensure continuity of management.

    At a minimum the day-to-day operational management responsibilities of the Chief Public Health Officer of the PHAC during a national foodborne emergency, should be temporarily assigned to an acting deputy head for the PHAC until the end of the emergency.

Multi-departmental governance of food safety

Responsibility for food safety within the federal government is shared to various degrees among the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Health Canada, and the Public Health Agency of Canada. While some would propose that a single organization should assume responsibility for all these functions, we recognize that it would be too complex and inefficient to address the current gaps and conflicts by such a major structural change.

However, we believe that there is an urgent need to put in place a coordinating body, which should focus on implementing actions to address the recommendations presented in this report. It could also examine the opportunity to institute a joint Scientific Committee on Food Safety.

Consideration could be given to a more permanent structure to develop an overall approach to federal food safety policies and programs with a more cohesive and forward looking agenda than is currently in place, such as existed between 1988 and 1994 - the Interdepartmental Committee of Food Regulations.

With the creation of PHAC and introduction of a third federal entity with key responsibilities for food safety in 2005, the need for joint action is greater than ever and demands a pre-determined coordinating structure to instil rigour, focus, and timely direction.

Recommendation:

  1. The Clerk of the Privy Council should appoint an independent expert to chair a special committee of the deputy ministers responsible for Health Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. The chair should report to the Clerk directly. This committee should provide recommendations to improve the ways the organizations work together in their roles in food safety. It should also oversee the development of our proposal to simplify and modernize federal legislation and regulations.

The first tasks of this committee should be to reduce overlaps and address gaps among the organizations, improve communication and the sharing of information, resolve existing issues preventing harmonization of roles, and provide a report on these matters within six months.

Multi-jurisdictional governance of food safety

At the national level, food safety is the joint responsibility of the federal, provincial and territorial, and local governments. This joint responsibility has its roots in the federal and provincial powers set out in the Constitution Act, 1867.2

Food safety is important to all consumers and, therefore, important to all levels of government. Canadians expect governments to collaborate and ensure that the food supply is safe, wherever they eat or purchase their food, and care little about jurisdictional matters.

Nonetheless, improving the way governments address food safety is a cumbersome undertaking, given the multiple jurisdictions and complex issues involved. Moving forward in an efficient and proactive manner remains a challenge for all.

"It was not clear to the partners which responsibilities rested with the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Chief Public Health Officer, and which ones with the Chief Medical Officer of Health in Ontario. It was also not clear whether the lead federal agency was PHAC or the CFIA, or to what extent local medical officers of health or the Chief Medical Officer of Health in Ontario could act alone to protect public health."

Dr. David Williams
Chief Medical Officer of Health's Report on the management of the 2008 listeriosis outbreak in Ontario

Despite these difficulties, since the mid-1980s, a series of coordinated efforts among the various jurisdictions has led to the development of preliminary components of a national integrated food safety system. For example, in 1989 there was work to review regulations and statutes to ensure that terminology was uniform and consistent.

These efforts have evolved and increased over the past two decades, yet many of the problems remain unresolved. This was noted in the 2004 Auditor General of Canada Report on the Food Safety System, which highlighted the complexity and challenges faced by all levels of government in effectively managing such a demanding sector.

There is a Federal-Provincial/Territorial Food Safety Committee, currently composed of, and chaired by, Assistant Deputy Ministers from Health and Agriculture Ministries across Canada. Its purpose is to present all government perspectives on food safety as new issues emerge.

Although this committee released a draft report in September 2008 entitled 'National Strategy for Safe Food'. However, the report addresses only some of the weaknesses that became apparent in the 2008 outbreak. More concerted and focused efforts are needed to address current gaps in the multi-jurisdictional management of foodborne emergencies. Furthermore, this report does not appear to have been endorsed by Ministers.

In recent years, the work of the Food Safety Committee on has not had the same level of support as in the past when Deputy Ministers led these files on behalf of their respective governments.

Recommendation:

  1. Considering the serious implications of foodborne illnesses, governments should create a distinct federal, provincial and territorial committee reporting regularly to the federal Minister of Health. The Minister should share the progress of this committee with his provincial and territorial ministerial counterparts regularly.

    This committee should enable national preparedness for foodborne outbreaks. One of its first tasks should be to develop and implement programs alerting vulnerable populations to the risks of listeriosis and identifying recommended sanitation and prevention practices.

    The committee should be composed of officials from the Health and Agriculture Ministries across Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and the Public Health Agency of Canada.

Going forward

In the November 2008 Speech for the Throne and subsequent budget, the Government of Canada committed to "keeping Canadians safe by putting in place new rules for food safety."

The 2008 outbreak has underscored the importance of a safe and nutritious food supply to the social and economic well being of all Canadians. In addition, given the increase in foodborne emergencies around the world, it is important for all Canadians as well as for Canada's reputation as a major world class supplier of safe and high quality food, to continue to instil public confidence in Canada's food production and distribution chain.

Canada is well positioned to succeed as it addresses the various recommendations outlined in this report. However, in light of the findings of this investigation, and in order to play a global leadership role, the following is recommended.

Recommendations:

  1. In setting its agenda for the fall of 2009, the government should be mindful that due to globalization and increased Canada-wide production and distribution of food, food safety will require increased attention. Although Canada is already a leader in food safety practices and systems, the government should clearly and emphatically commit to the safety of food as one of its top priorities.
  2. Following its receipt and review of this report, the government should commit to reporting back to Canadians, within two years, on the implementation of the recommendations contained in this report together with an assessment of their impact on improving Canada's food inspection and food safety emergency response systems.

1 Public Health Law & Policy in Canada, Second Edition, Bailey, Caulfield, Ries, Chapter 12, Foodborne Illness and Public Health (Ronald L. Doering), p. 483-4.

2 Online